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Time-varying international diversification and the forward
premium
Abstract
This paper reproduces the slope of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) regression for six different
country pairs within one standard deviation under rational expectations. While standard theory predicts a
slope of one, the empirically observed slope of the regression of currency returns on the interest rate
differential between two countries is negative for most country pairs. This empirical fact that, on
average, investors require higher returns on bonds denominated in a currency expected to appreciate,
poses a strong challenge for economic models. In this paper, we propose a potential explanation within
an infinite horizon dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets.
Heterogenous investors experience varying risk aversion as a result of habit formation. The underlying
mechanism of the model relies on varying international diversification in the investors' portfolio choice
decision. In response to their changing habit levels, investors' hedging desire varies over time, leading to
adjustments in interest rates. The habit-induced investment decisions are negatively correlated with ex-
change rate movements. This leads to a negative correlation between interest rates and expected
exchange rates, as implied by a negative UIP slope. Depending on the magnitude of habits, the model is
capable of reproducing positive as well as negative UIP slopes, as seen empirically in the data.
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Abstract
This paper reproduces the slope of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) re-
gression for six different country pairs within one standard deviation under rational
expectations.
While standard theory predicts a slope of one, the empirically observed slope
of the regression of currency returns on the interest rate differential between two
countries is negative for most country pairs. This empirical fact that, on average,
investors require higher returns on bonds denominated in a currency expected to
appreciate, poses a strong challenge for economic models. In this paper, we propose
a potential explanation within an infinite horizon dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model with incomplete markets. Heterogenous investors experience varying
risk aversion as a result of habit formation.
The underlying mechanism of the model relies on varying international diversifi-
cation in the investors’ portfolio choice decision. In response to their changing habit
levels, investors’ hedging desire varies over time, leading to adjustments in interest
rates. The habit-induced investment decisions are negatively correlated with ex-
change rate movements. This leads to a negative correlation between interest rates
and expected exchange rates, as implied by a negative UIP slope.
Depending on the magnitude of habits, the model is capable of reproducing
positive as well as negative UIP slopes, as seen empirically in the data.
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1 Introduction
The forward premium anomaly, discovered by Fama (1984), is one of the most prevalent
puzzles in international finance. The uncovered interest parity (UIP) implies that high
interest currencies should depreciate. However, a large body of empirical literature finds
exactly the opposite — high interest currencies tend to appreciate. Investors in high yield
currencies benefit twice, once from the interest rate spread and once from the expected
appreciation.
Given the complexity and resilience of the puzzle, economists have been searching for
a potential explanation ever since its discovery. Approaches towards solving the puzzle
may be organized into three categories: irrational expectations, market frictions and risk
premia. This paper develops a two-country model under rational expectations without
market frictions, and thus attributes the anomaly to large and time-varying risk premia.
This is achieved through two major model ingredients. First, markets are assumed to
be incomplete. There is no asset that directly allows individuals to insure their income
risk, preventing them from completely aggregating their individual risk. The extent to
which insurance is possible depends on the correlation of income with existing financial
assets. Second, we assume that consumers form habits according to their consumption
history. The predominant effect of habit formation is that it changes the price of risk over
time. When consumption drops close to the habit level, marginal utility increases and
the implied risk aversion rises. Contrarily, a large wedge between consumption and habit
implies small risk aversion.
We attribute the anomaly to time-varying international diversification decisions that
arise endogenously due to the varying risk aversion. In the absence of habit expected
exchange rates directly affect interest rates and thus the correlation between the two would
be always plus one. Now, time varying risk aversion introduces time-varying international
investment decisions, which are negatively correlated with the expected exchange rate1.
This allows, for sufficiently large habit levels, to overcome the primary effect and reproduce
the negative correlation.
With habit levels common in the literature2, we are able to reproduce the forward
premium anomaly for six different country pairs, which are formed by combining Ger-
many, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. We distinguish between two different
calibrations. In a first attempt, we assume the same habit level for each country. Al-
though this implies an almost complete lack of flexibility in the model calibration the
UIP slope is still almost within the 95% confidence interval of the empirical estimation
for each country pair. In a second attempt, we allow for different habit levels for each
country pair. Then the slope of each country pair lies within one standard deviation of
the empirical observation.
Furthermore our model is capable of matching many empirical moments that are
crucial in such a setting. The introduction of tradables and non-tradable goods allows
to match the first moments of inflation and exchange rate processes simultaneously. In
addition, the calibration matches the first moments of the income growth and most notably
the correlation between income growth and exchange rates for every country.
Few other papers are successful in reproducing negative slope coefficients. Two no-
table exceptions under rational expectations and without market frictions are Bansal and
1E.g. when a currency is expected to appreciate more, the model dynamics imply that the investor
has a preference for the other currency at the same time.
2Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Verdelhan (2010)
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Shaliastovich (2009) and Verdelhan (2010).
Bansal and Shaliastovich extend the long run risk framework proposed in Bansal
and Yaron (2004) to two countries. Time-varying volatility of the long run risk factor
in combination with Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences allow the authors to achieve a
negative UIP slope coefficient.
Verdelhan provides an explanation to the anomaly in the Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) habit framework. He assumes pro-cyclical interest rates, which, combined with
habit driven counter-cyclical risk aversions, replicate the anomaly.
Bansal and Shaliastovich assume fully country specific goods3, while Verdelhan as-
sumes large transportation costs. In both cases this implies the absence of trade and
allows to model consumption as an exogenous process.
This paper is similar to Verdelhan in that we attribute the anomaly to risk premia,
which vary due to habit formation. In our model, however, we allow for trade and interna-
tional investment decisions by determining consumption endogenously. Theoretically, this
allows for feedback effects between the two countries and generally for richer dynamics
within the model. Empirically, it allows to replicate more and different moments. Most
notably, as these are risk premium stories, we are capable of reproducing the negative
UIP slope, while matching the correlation between income and exchange rates.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section two we present our model
followed by a description of our numerical solution method in section three. In section
four we describe our calibration. Section five discusses our model results and section six
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 General setup
2.1.1 Real Economy
This model describes an exchange economy of two infinitely lived countries, in which each
country is endowed with two types of nondurable consumption goods, one tradable, one
nontradable. Each country is represented by one agent4. In each period, agents receive a
share α of their endowments in the nontradable good yNG,t = αyt and a share 1 − α in
the tradable good yTG,t = (1 − α)yt. The agents consider the foreign tradable good as a
perfect substitute for the domestic tradable good and possess Cobb-Douglas preferences
over the two consumption goods,
u(cTG,t, cNG,t) =
2
1− γ
(
c
1
2
TG,tc
1
2
NG,t
)1−γ
.
For ease of notation we refer to the vector of consumption ct = (cTG,t, cNG,t), whenever
an explicit distinction between tradables and non-tradables is not necessary.
3Also referred to as full home bias. Each country produces a different good and consumers only
have preferences over the good produced in their own country. This assumption is crucial because in a
two-country and complete markets setup, the representative investors can fully share risk and the real
exchange rate is constant, defeating any potential explanation of the anomaly.
4We name them agent H and agent F and they reside in country 1 and country 2.
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2.1.2 Financial Economy
Each country has separate exogenous price levels, determining the relative value of the
currency. We measure the price level in terms of the nominal price of the tradable good
in each country.5 In addition, we assume that goods and assets can only be traded in the
currency of the home country. Furthermore, we assume that Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) holds for tradable goods, thus determining the nominal exchange rate as
St =
p1,t
p2,t
,
where p1,t and p2,t refer to the price levels (e.g. prices of tradables) in the two countries.
6
Each country issues a one-period bond with no possibility to default on its debt.
Denoting prices and nominal holdings of bonds, issued by country i by qi,t and Bi,t re-
spectively, and introducing a superscript to identify the country that chooses the economic
variable,7 the home country’s budget constraint in nominal terms can be written as
CHTG,t ≤ W
H
t + Y
H
TG,t − q1,tB
H
1,t − q2,tB
H
2,t,
where WHt = B
H
1,t−1 + StB
H
2,t−1 represents nominal wealth of country H. For this wealth,
we assume there is some boundary on real debt
WH1,t
p1,t
≥ w¯H .
2.1.3 Uncertainty
Uncertainty enters the model through real and monetary shocks, zt will denote the
vector of all such shocks. It is assumed to follow a first order Markov Process with
transition function Π(zt+1|zt). Real shocks change the endowment of consumption good
(yNG,t(zt), yTG,t(zt)) available to each country, whereas monetary shocks change the infla-
tion in each country. This has two important implications. Firstly, these shocks determine
the exchange rate by PPP. Secondly, although the countries cannot default and the bond
appears as riskless, the introduction of shocks to price levels imply a consumption risk of
holding bonds.
Note that, since the financial economy consists of only two bonds and there are in
general many shocks to income and inflation, markets are incomplete.
2.1.4 Summary
Figure 1 summarizes our model setup. We assume, there are two countries, for example
United States and Japan. Each country has a distinct currency and issues a nominally
riskless zero bond. Risk enters the model through stochastic inflation rates in each country,
affecting the real payouts of the bonds.
5Prices of non-tradables have no impact on agents’ decisions in our model.
6Given the empirical evidence on absolute and relative PPP it cannot be claimed that PPP holds
for a general basket of goods. Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005), however, show that PPP
holds approximately for tradables, if one chooses the definition of tradable good carefully. In particular,
they distinguish between production and distribution of tradable goods. They argue that distribution is
essentially nontradable. Based on this distinction they show empirically that even in times of extreme
exchange rate fluctuations PPP holds approximately for tradables.
7This notation will be used throughout the paper.
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USA Japan
B1
B2
Currency: $
Stochastic inflation rate: piHt
Riskless zero bond ($): B1
Bond price: q1,t
Currency: ¥
Stochastic inflation rate: piFt
Riskless zero bond (¥): B2
Bond price : q2,t
Figure 1: Market Setup
2.2 Habit utility
Agents in our model form habits according to the history of aggregate consumption. Abel
(1990) first proposed this external habit, commonly referred to as “catching up with the
Joneses.” Agents’ effective consumption is reduced by their habit levels, resulting in
u(ct, ht) = u(ct − ht) = u(cTG,t − hTG,t, cNG,t − hNG,t).
Concerning the habit process, we follow the standard specification in the literature8,
denoting habit as a weighted average of past consumption.9 In recursive form this process
can be written as
ht+1 = ρht + ηct+1.
For simplicity we consider the same habit level for tradables and nontradable goods,
where we take nontradable consumption as a proxy for aggregate consumption. The good-
specific habit levels are then formed as fractions of the aggregate habit level proportionally
to the amount of tradables and nontradables in the economy.
This specification of habit increases the local curvature of the utility function, and
thus, increases the risk aversion of agents. Moreover risk aversion changes as agents
experience different shocks to endowment. In times of consumption levels close to habit
levels, marginal utilities are large and agents very risk averse. Contrarily, in times, when
consumption is much higher than habit, marginal utilities are relatively small and the
price of risk is low. Thus habit formation allows for large, time varying risk premia.
For the purpose of the calibration, ρ and η are hard to interprete. Therefore we use
and report the first two moments of the habit process. It can be shown that there exists
the following mapping from the moments to ρ and η,
ρ =
E[h]2
E[c]2
V[c]− V[h]
E[h]2
E[c]2
V[c] + V[h]
,
8See among many others Constantinides (1990), Ferson and Constantinides (1991), Heaton (1995).
9Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Verdelhan (2010) use a nonlinear habit process, which is set on
the surplus consumption ratio c−h
c
. Working with the surplus consumption ratio is very convenient in
their models and the nonlinearity of the process has interesting implications in their framework. However,
in our opinion, the approach by Constantinides is the economically more intuitive choice.
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η = (1− ρ)
E[h]
E[c]
,
where E refers to the unconditional expectation and V to the unconditional variance of
the consumption and reference process.
2.3 Optimization problem
The optimization problem for each agent is
max
Ct,B1,t,B2,t
∞∑
t=0
u(ct, ht), (1)
subject to the budget constraint, the law of motion of wealth and the borrowing constraint.
We seek a competitive equilibrium, that is a sequence of asset prices qt = (q1,t, q2,t) and
portfolio holdings Bt = (B1,t, B2,t)
10, such that given qt, the choice of Bt solves (1), subject
to the constraints and market clearing. For each agent we can rewrite the sequence
problem into the corresponding recursive problem. Define zt = (pi
H
t , pi
F
t , Y
H
t , Y
F
t ), Ψt =
(Wt, zt, ht), then
Vt(Ψt) = max
Ct,B1,t,B2,t
u(ct − ht) + δ Et[Vt+1(Ψt+1)], (2)
subject to
CNG,t ≤ YNG,t,
CTG,t ≤ Wt + YTG,t − q1,tB1,t − q2,tB2,t,
Wt+1 = B1,t + St+1B2,t,
B1,t ≥ B,
B2,t ≥ 0.
Defining real bond holdings b1,t =
B1,t
p1,t
, we impose the following market clearing condi-
tions:
 Bonds are in zero net supply
bH1,t + b
F
1,t = 0,
bH2,t + b
F
2,t = 0.
 Nontradable goods cannot be traded
cHNG,t − y
H
NG,t = 0,
cFNG,t − y
F
NG,t = 0.
 Aggregate consumption in tradables is equal to aggregate endowments
cHTG,t + c
F
TG,t − y
H
TG,t − y
F
TG,t = 0.
10Through the budget constraint, portfolio holdings imply a consumption path.
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E[∆s] ↓ ⇔ iH − iF ↑
(a) Empirical Observation
yH ↑ E[∆s] ↓ iH ↓ iH − iF ↓
yH ↑ c ↑ H ↑ RP ↑ iH − iF ↑
corr(yH , s) < 0 payoff ↑
iH riskier
Puzzle
(b) Model Dynamics (negative correlation)
yH ↑ E[∆s] ↑ iH ↑ iH − iF ↑
yH ↑ c ↑ H ↑ RP ↑ iH − iF ↓
corr(yH , s) > 0 payoff ↑
iF riskier
Puzzle
(c) Model Dynamics (positive correlation)
Figure 2: Illustration of the central Mechanism
2.4 Model Dynamics
2.4.1 Incomplete markets
The only financial assets in the model are the two bonds. As they fall short of spanning
the state space, markets are incomplete. In complete markets, agents would be able to
fully share their risk. They could trade the aggregate income stream so that in equilibrium
each agent received a constant share of aggregate income in each state. In our incomplete
market setup agents do not have this possibility. Completing markets in our model would
require introducing an asset whose payout depends on the change in GDP. We generally
do not observe such an asset in the real world, which justifies the assumption of incomplete
markets. Because, in such a setup, agents are only partly able to insure their income risk,
we obtain higher and more-volatile risk premia, both necessary to explain the forward
premium anomaly11.
2.4.2 Reproducing the negative slope coefficient
Figure 2 displays the underlying mechanism in our model. The objective is to reproduce
the empirical fact that E[∆s] is negatively correlated with iH − iF . There are two major
channels in the model linking exchange rates and interest rate differentials. Empirically
we observe positive as well as negative correlations between exchange rates and income
growth. The model dynamics are slightly different in the two cases, therefore we will now
describe the dynamics for each case separetely.
11Engel (1996).
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Negative Correlation
Firstly, we will elaborate the dynamics, when income growth is negatively correlated
with the exchange rate. Please refer to Figure 2(b). The first channel is the standard
UIP effect. By assumption, a positive shock to income in the home country leads to an
expected appreciation (st ↓) of the currency. Given an appreciation of the home currency
(E[∆s] ↑), investors will demand a lower return on the home bond (iH ↓) according to
the uncovered interest parity.
The second channel is novel and provides the explanation for the existence of the
forward premium. In addition to the direct effect of a positive income shock on expected
exchange rates, a positive income shock also induces more consumption and thus a higher
habit level and thus risk aversion. This stimulates the home countrys demand for foreign
bonds, reduces the foreign interest rate, leading to a larger interest rate differential.
If the second effect quantitatively outweighs the first effect, this could provide a pos-
sible explanation for the forward premium as the home currency appreciates, while the
interest rate differential increases.
Positive Correlation
Secondly, consider the case, where income growth is positivelf correlated with the ex-
change rate, displayed in Figure 2(c). The underlying idea is the same as for negative
correlation. Only two crucial steps change their sign. First, obviously as correlation is
positive, a positive income shock leads to a depreciation (st ↑). However, now the in-
vestor in the home country, considers the foreign asset as more risky, therefore the second
channel changes signs as well and the negative slope coefficient can still be reproduced.
Overall international diversification enables agents to hedge some of their income risk.
As a result of income fluctuation and peoples’ habit formation, the desire for international
diversification fluctuates over time. This leads to time-varying preferences over the home
versus the foreign bond, which are negatively correlated with the expected change in
the exchange rate. Thus, possibly resulting in a negative correlation between interest
rate differential and expected exchang rates, depending on the relative magnitude of the
UIP-payoff channel, versus the habit channel.
3 Computation
In order to solve the dynamic programming problem (2) computationally, it is necessary
as a preliminary step to discretize the problem to a finite number of shocks. In practice
this translates into approximating the estimated processes (i.e. income and exchange rate
process for each country) by a discrete shock vector and an associated transition matrix.
We simply follow the standard choice in the literature and use an implementation of
Tauchens algorithm (Tauchen (1986), Tauchen and Hussey (1991)).
Furthermore, we discretize the habit process into a discrete number of habit states. As
the process for habits takes in theory a continuum of possible values, we always set habit
at the beginning of each period to the closest level within the discrete space of possible
habit values.
Equipped with shock and transition matrices, net wealth of agent A fully describes
the endogenous state space, as it summarizes the past actions of agent A. Wealth of agent
B can simply be deduced through market clearing. Given the relevant state space of the
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economy, we use standard dynamic programming techniques to solve for the competitive
equilibrium.
In particular we iterate over the consumption policy. The initial policy for each agent
is mostly complete debt roll-over, i.e. indebted agents pay back only a small amount of
their loan in a two-period model.12 Then, in each step of the time iteration, we solve
the nonlinear system of equations (see Appendix A.3, page 18) on a finite grid over net
wealth and subsequently approximate the new consumption policy with cubic splines.
There is no theorem guaranteeing the convergence to or even the existence of a policy
function satisfying the dynamic programming problem.13 However, as long as we observe
convergence towards a policy function, we know that it is a solution to the infinite horizon
dynamic programming problem within the computational margin of error14.
Finally, we simulate a large number of exogenous shocks for income and exchange rates
and compute many possible outcomes of the economy given the optimal policy functions.
Then we perform the interest parity regression on the simulated data to test for the
slope and observe additional implications of our model on various economic and financial
variables.
4 Calibration
To assess our model’s power to explain the forward premium anomaly, we calibrate the
model to observed data for various countries. The set of countries, picked by economic
significance, comprises Canada (CA), Germany (DE), Japan (JP), United Kingdom (UK)
and the United States (US). The analysis puts special emphasis on the country pair United
States and Japan, since they are the two largest economies, represent two dominant
currencies; and most importantly as the anomaly is particularly robust for this country
pair15.
4.1 Currency baskets
To calibrate the Markov Chain, we need inflation and income data. While income data is
readily available, tradable good inflation is not. Broad price indices, such as the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), are not suitable since they incorporate both tradable and nontradable
prices. More seriously, the usage of these indices would result in a model-implied exchange
rate process that is completely different from the one observed in the data. This stands in
sharp contrast to the paper’s main goal of explaining the relationship between exchange
rates and interest rates.
To avoid the above issues connected with price indices, we exploit the fact that the
relation between tradable good prices in two countries is given as the exchange rate under
PPP. More precisely, tradable good inflation in one country is is measured as the valution
12In some cases of relatively high habit levels, this turned out to be not fully robust. In these cases,
we first solve for lower levels of habit and then use the solutions as starting policies for higher levels of
habit.
13For a discussion see Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) and Kubler and Schmed-
ders (2005).
14The maximum deviations we allowed for were 10−10 for each individual FOC and 10−7 for the
maximum change in consumption policies.
15Han (2004) performs a large cross-country, cross-period comparison to test whether the anomaly
is universal. Performing regressions for varying time horizons in the range 1979 to 1998, he finds the
percentage of observed negative beta coefficients is 96% for the US and Japan.
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Country AU CA CH DE DK FR NL NO SE SG UK
Share 3.3 11.9 4.6 24.8 2.6 14.5 9.8 2.5 4.0 6.2 15.7
Table 1: Composition of the reference currency basket for the country-pair Japan-US
of that country’s currency against a broad index of other countrys’ currencies. For each
currency pair, we construct a currency basket of all remaining countries.16 Tradable good
inflation for one country is then derived as a weighted average of exchange rates of this
country to all other countries in the basket. More formally, for a given country pair a, b,
tradable good inflation is given as
Πj =
∑
∀i 6=a,b
wiS
i,j j = a, b,
where wi is the weight of currency i in the basket and S
i,a is the price of currency a in
terms of currency i.
The weights reflect the importance of country i for tradable good inflation in country
j. Therefore, we choose the weights as the shares on world trade. More precisely, the
relative vlaue of the sum of each country’s aggregate imports and exports with country i.
As an example the currency basket for the country-pair US - JP is displayed in Table 1.
From here on, we will refer to the tradable good inflation process of a country simply as
the country’s (basket) exchange rate.
4.2 Estimation of exogeneous state variables
Equipped with the exchange rate process for each country, we can estimate the majority
of the model parameters from data. In particular we estimate the exogenous shocks to
income and inflation with a Vector Autoregressive Regression (VaR) of order one as(
∆yt
∆st
)
=
(
α1
α2
)
+
(
θy θy,s
θs,y θs
)(
∆yt−1
∆st−1
)
+
(
t,y
t,s
)
, (3)
where ∆y and ∆s refer to the change in logs of income and exchange rates against the
currency basket17, α and θ are the estimated coefficients and  residuals.
4.2.1 Inflation of Tradables — Persistence
It turns out empirically that in the VaR regression (3) the coefficients θy,s and θs are
universally insignificant. Thus, none of the analyzed countries show signs of significant
persistence in exchange rates. Table 2 displays the persistence estimates and p-values for
21 different currencies. Only two currencies even come close to the significance treshold.
Therefore we simply set these values for all countries to zero. Arguably this assumption
makes a difference for our model economy. Without it, a second channel for a direct payoff
effect opens up, working against the above proposed habit effect. However, in our opinion,
the empirical evidence legitimates the assumption of zero exchange rate persistence.
4.2.2 Markov Chain Approximation
16It is convenient to exclude both countries in the basket in order to still obtain an exact match of the
exchange rate when applying PPP.
17Exchange Rates are denoted as reference currency over home currency.
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Ctry Parameter Data [s.e.] Model
JP
FX growth
Mean E[∆s] 1.009 0.005 1.009
Std. σ[∆s] 0.055 0.004 0.044
Income growth
Mean E[∆y] 1.005 0.001 1.005
Std. σ[∆y] 0.011 0.001 0.009
Pers. θy 0.233 0.093 0.166
Corr. ρ∆s,∆y -0.208 0.089 -0.207
US
FX growth
Mean E[∆s] 0.998 0.004 0.998
Std. σ[∆s] 0.045 0.003 0.035
Income growth
Mean E[∆y] 1.007 0.001 1.007
Std. σ[∆y] 0.009 0.000 0.007
Pers. θy 0.350 0.074 0.254
Corr. ρ∆s,∆y -0.030 0.079 -0.030
Table 3: Empirical and Model Moments
Ctry1 Ctry2 Pers. Pval
AU CH 0.01 0.90
AU DE -0.01 0.89
AU FR 0.02 0.86
AU JP 0.07 0.38
AU UK -0.05 0.52
AU US 0.07 0.38
CH DE -0.08 0.37
CH FR 0.01 0.94
CH JP 0.10 0.21
CH UK 0.02 0.81
CH US 0.02 0.84
DE FR -0.02 0.82
DE JP 0.11 0.20
DE UK 0.09 0.34
DE US 0.09 0.35
FR JP 0.17 0.05
FR UK 0.10 0.31
FR US 0.14 0.15
JP UK 0.13 0.11
JP US 0.06 0.49
UK US 0.16 0.05
Table 2: Persistence estimates
and P-Values of Log Returns on
Exchange Rates
The remaining results of the VaR regression (3) need
to be discretized to accomodate our model. There-
fore we discretize the process for each country into a
Markov Chain with 9 states. Table 3 displays various
statistics describing the result of the empirical estima-
tion for the country pair US - JP, showing the high
quality of the Markov Chain Approximation. There
are some minor deviations in standard deviations and
persistences due to some bias in the discretization, but
correlation, clearly a crucial parameter, is matched
precisely. Similar accuracy is achieved for the remain-
ing country pairs.
4.3 Remaining parameters
Some parameters, especially preference parameters,
cannot easily be estimated from data. Our calibra-
tion for these parameters is summarized in table 4.
The share of nontradables in each country is set to
0.518. The discount factor is set to 0.99 which is stan-
dard in the literature for quarterly horizons. Relative
risk aversion (γ) is set to 2.00, which is consistent
with economic experiments and is also standard in
the literature.
The habit volatility is chosen as approximately
half the level of income volatility. This reflects the
18Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) estimated the share of nontradables as 0.43 for US and
0.48 for Korea.
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fact that habit is implicitly driven by changes in in-
come, yet varies less than income. Furthermore the average level of habit is chosen such
that it matches the model implied β with the empirically observed β. The resulting
average habit level (h¯) amounts to 0.95.19
Habit for each country is discretized on a linear grid, resulting in two additional
parameters to be picked in our parameterization. Firstly, we set the grid’s range. We
calculate the upper bound as the average habit plus some scaling factor times the volatility
of habit (E[H] + ζσ[H]) and the lower bound accordingly. Secondly, we set the scaling
factor to 1 and choose three points for the size of the grid.
Finally, we also need to choose the discretization of wealth. We assume that countries
cannot accumulate debt beyond 10% of their net wealth. We choose 11 gridpoints for the
approximation of the wealth state space.20
Parameter (Quarterly) Value
Share of Nontradables α 0.50
Discount factor δ 0.99
Risk aversion γ 2.00
Average Habit Level E[H] 0.91
Habit volatitility σ[H] 0.005
Habit scaling factor ζ 1
Habit grid size 3
wealth boundaries w¯H = w¯F -0.1
wealth grid size 11
Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
5 Results
5.1 Simulation
Given the optimal policies, we simulate the model economy. Table 5 displays the intercept
and slope coefficient of a UIP regression using our model economy’s data and correspond-
ing actual data for the country pair US - JP. Our model matches both the slope and the
intercept reasonably well.
5.2 Impact of habit
Figure 3 displays the impact of the average implied risk aversion on the slope coefficient for
three different levels of habit volatility. The implied risk aversion, displayed on the abcisse
is strictly increasing in habit and is locally interpretable as the relative risk aversion of an
19Due to the discretization of the habit grid, the actual empirical moments might vary slightly from
these values. Therefore we report in table ? also the empirical moments.
20Arguably the choices for the discretization of habit and wealth are arbitrary. We are currently
working on a robustness section, which will show that the calibration of habit (e.g. the choice of E[H]
and σ[H]) might vary in these parameters, yet the overall results remain unchanged for values within a
reasonable range.
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Parameter (Quarterly) Data [s.e.] Model [s.e.]
FP - intercept α 0.03 [0.01] 0.02 [< 0.001]
FP - slope β −0.65 [0.25] −0.44 [0.058]
Table 5: Exemplary simulation of Japan versus United States
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 10 20 30 40 50
U
IP
S
lo
p
e
Implied risk aversion of average habit
0.000
0.003
0.006
Figure 3: UIP slope for the country pair Japan - US over average habit. The three lines
represent different levels of habit volatility.
agent with power utility. It is a common measure used to assess the risk aversion implied
by different habit levels and thus allows for comparison across models. In the case of
relatively small habit levels the model simply reproduces the uncovered interest parity,
β ≈ 1. Habit is too small to create large enough risk premia, which could break the direct
link between interest rate differentials and subsequent exchange rate fluctuations.
As average habit levels and thus risk aversion rise, the habit induced international
diversification effect becomes more and more relevant and encompasses the primary payoff
effect.
For a constant level of habit 21 (the solid line), an implied risk aversion of 35 is
needed to create sufficiently high risk premia for a negative UIP slope. As we increase
the volatility of habit (the two dashed lines), lower and lower levels of average habit are
necessary.
Figure 4 shows the variation in the UIP slope, when changing the volatility of habit.
Zero volatility results in the standard prediction of a slope coefficient close to one. When
21Please not that this does not imply constant risk aversion, since consumption varies and risk aversion
is given as γ/(c− h)
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Figure 4: UIP slope for the country pair Japan - US for over standard deviation (volatility)
of habit. The three lines represent different levels of average habit.
the average habit level is zero, e.g. risk aversion is around two, an increase in the volatility
of habit has no impact on the slope coefficient.
Habit volatility starts to impact the slope coefficient, only when average habit levels
are higher (e.g. 0.9 and 0.91 which roughly amounts to a risk aversion of around 20). As
we increase habit volatility the slope coefficient decreases almost monotonously.
5.3 Multiple countries
In addition to the detailed analysis for the country-pair US-Japan, we conduct our analysis
for five additional country pairs. These are formed by pairwise combination of Germany,
Japan, United Kingdom and the United States. Initially, we estimate a Markov Chain
for each country pair individually as described in the calibration section, then we solve
for optimal policies and finally compute the model implied UIP slope coefficient, which
we compare to the data.
For this purpose, we look at two different calibration scenarios. Initilaly, we assume
that every country has the same habit level. Then, we allow for a different habit level for
each country pair.22
22It is somehow inconsistent to assume different habit levels for the same country, when compared to
different other countries. Ideally, we would like to have a country-specific habit level, instead of a country-
pair specific country level. Due to the introduced interdependencies this becomes computationally very
intense and constitutes current work in progress.
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Ctry1 Ctry2 Emp. β [s.e.] Model β
JP DE 0.116 [0.296] -0.196
JP US -0.628 [0.251] -0.218
UK DE 0.274 [0.186] -0.034
UK JP -1.049 [0.386] -0.205
UK US -0.043 [0.198] 0.069
US DE -0.026 [0.220] 0.374
Table 6: Empirical versus Model implied UIP slope coefficient for a common habit cali-
bration (E[H] = 0.95, σ[H] = 0.006)
Ctry1 Ctry2 EA sigmaA Emp. β [s.e.] Model β
JP DE 0.880 0.006 0.116 [0.296] 0.127
JP US 0.930 0.005 -0.628 [0.251] -0.416
UK DE 0.800 0.003 0.274 [0.186] 0.342
UK JP 0.900 0.007 -1.049 [0.386] -0.682
UK US 0.950 0.006 -0.043 [0.198] 0.069
US DE 0.950 0.007 -0.026 [0.220] -0.036
Table 7: Empirical versus Model implied UIP slope coefficient for varying levels of habit
5.3.1 Common habit level
Table 6 shows the result for one common habit calibration. Here we want to almost
completely tie our hands in terms of the parameter choice. Most parameters are either
determined by empirical data (e.g. the calibration of income and exchange rate processes)
or have almost no impact on the results (e.g. the technical parameters for the discretiza-
tion).23. The only parameters we vary to match the empirical slope are E[H] = 0.9 and
σ[H] = 0.006. Despite the strongly reduced degrees of freedom, the model remains capa-
ble of explaining the empirically observed slope coefficient within two standard deviations
for each country pair.
5.3.2 Varying habit level
Finally, we vary the two parameters of the habit process freely across country pairs.
Table 7 displays the resulting slope coefficients against the empirical counterparts. In this
setup the model is able to reproduce the empirical slope coefficient within one standard
deviation.
6 Conclusion
The present paper proposes an explanation for the forward premium anomaly in a rational
expectation framework. The habit-based model with endogenous saving decisions is able
to reproduce the empirical anomaly for six different country pairs.
23We are currently working on a robustness section, demonstrating the claim of no impact on the
results.
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A First order conditions
A.1 Normalization
In order to solve our model we first rewrite the nominal problem (eq. 2) into the according
real problem. For this purpose we set price level of nontradables to 1 and the price level
of tradables as p1 respectively p2 for each country.
Let us denote R1,t =
1
1+piHt
and R2,t =
1
1+piFt
as the real returns of each bond. Fur-
thermore we redefine the shock vector and state space in real terms as follows: zt =
(R1,t, R2,t, y
H
t , y
F
t ) and Ψt = (wt, zt, ht). Then the dynamic programming problem trans-
forms into
Vt(Ψt) = max
ct,b1,t,b2,t
u(ct, ht) + β Et[Vt+1(Ψt+1)],
subject to
cTG,t ≤ wt + yTG,t − q1,tb1,t − q2,tb2,t,
cNG,t ≤ yNG,t,
wt+1 = R1,t+1b1,t +R2,t+1b2,t,
b1,t ≥
b¯1
E[R1,t+1]
,
b2,t ≥
b¯2
E[R2,t+1]
,
w¯ ≤ b1,tq1,t + b2,tq2,t,
cTG,t ≥ hTG,t.
The last equation is unnecessary in theory. The utility function is simply not defined
for values smaller than 0. However, it is necessary to enforce the condition for com-
putational reasons, as a solver might try to step outside and evaluate the function for
cTG,t < (1 − η)ht. Depending on the choice of the risk aversion, this could either result
in complex numbers or even lead to a potential solution of the equation system, with no
economic meaning.
To facilitate computation, we additionally normalize each agent’s problem with factors
κA and κB respectively. Given homothetic preferences the individual’s policies are simply
scaled by the normalization factor. Thus, the equilibrium remains unchanged under the
appropriate adjustment of market clearing conditions (see next section).
Define z˜t = (R1,t+1, R2,t+1, y˜
H
t , y˜
F
t ) and Ψ˜t = (w˜t, z˜t, h˜t) where κy˜t = yt, then
Vt(Ψ˜t) = max
c˜t,b˜1,t,b˜2,t
u(c˜t, h˜t) + β Et[Vt+1(Ψ˜t+1)],
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subject to
c˜TG,t ≤ w˜t + y˜TG,t − q1,tb˜1,t − q2,tb˜2,t,
c˜NG,t ≤ y˜NG,t,
w˜t+1 = R1,t+1b˜1,t +R2,t+1b˜2,t,
b˜1,t ≥
˜¯b
E[R1,t+1]
,
b˜1,t ≥
˜¯b1
E[R1,t+1]
,
b˜2,t ≥
˜¯b2
E[R2,t+1]
,
˜¯w ≤ b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t,
c˜TG,t ≥ h˜TG,t
A.2 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
Concavity of the utility function allows us to impose equality for the first two conditions.
Inserting conditions two and three and denoting for simplicity u(ct, ht) = u(cTG,t) we can
write the Lagrangian as
L = u(c˜TG,t) + β Et[Vt+1(Ψ˜t+1)] + µ (y˜TG,t + w˜t − q1,tb˜1,t − q2,tb˜2,t − c˜TG,t)
+ λ1 (b˜1,tEt[R1,t+1]−
˜¯b1)
+ λ2 (b˜2,tEt[R2,t+1]−
˜¯)b2
+ λ3 (b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t − ˜¯)w
+ λnn (c˜TG,t − h˜TG,t).
Deriving the Lagrangian with respect to each choice variable, adding the conditions
and restrictions on the Lagrange multipliers provides us with the following system of first
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order conditions:
∂L
∂c˜TG,t
= u′(c˜TG,t)− µ+ λnn
!
= 0,
∂L
b˜1,t
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂b˜1,t
]
− µq1,t + λ1E[R1,t+1] + λ3q1,t
= β
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
pi(zt+1|zt)
∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂b˜1,t
]
− µq1,t + λ1E[R1,t+1] + λ3q1,t
= β
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
pi(zt+1|zt)
∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
R1,t+1
]
− µq1,t + λ1E[R1,t+1] + λ3q1,t
!
= 0,
∂L
b˜2,t
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂b˜2,t
]
− µq2,t + λ2 + λ3q2,t
= β
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
pi(zt+1|zt)
∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂w˜t+1
∂b˜2,t
]
− µq2,t + λ2E[R2,t+1] + λ3q2,t
= β
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
pi(zt+1|zt)
∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂c˜TG,t+1
∂w˜t+1
R2,t+1
]
− µq2,t + λ2E[R2,t+1] + λ3q2,t
!
= 0,
λ1(b˜1,tE[R1,t+1]−
˜¯b1) = 0,
λ2(b˜2,tEt[R2,t+1]−
˜¯b2) = 0,
λ3(b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t − w¯) = 0
λnn(c˜TG,t − (1− η)ht) = 0,
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, λnn ≥ 0
where Γ(zt) denotes all states possibly following zt and pi(zt+1|zt) are the transition prob-
abilities.
The same set of equations exists for the second agent and is completed by the market
clearing conditions
κAb˜A1,t + κ
B b˜B1,t = 0,
κAb˜A2,t + κ
B b˜B2,t = 0,
κAc˜ATG,t + κ
B c˜BTG,t = κ
Ay˜ATG,t + κ
B y˜BTG,t.
The market clearing conditions apply to the unnormalized economy. Thus, terms are
unnormalized with the agent specific normalization coefficient.
A.3 Alternative Conditions
It’s computationally inconvenient to work with the inequality constraints for the lagrange-
multiplier. Therefore we use the following reformulation as described in Zangwill and
Garcia (1981).
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The key is to replace the Lagrange multipliers by slacks, which are decomposed into
a positive and negative part
α+ = [ max(0, α) ]k,
α− = [ max(0,−α) ]k.
One would expect a k of 2 or 3 to work best to avoid any kinks in the nonlinear system
of equations. However, surprisingly, we find that k = 1 outperforms any other choice.
This allows us to rewrite the first order conditions into the following equivalent system
∂L
∂c˜TG,t
= u′(c˜TG,t)− µ+ αnn+
!
= 0,
∂L
b˜1,t
= β
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
pi(zt+1|zt)
∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
R1,t+1
]
− µq1,t + α1Et[R1,t+1] + α3q1,t
!
= 0,
∂L
b˜2,t
= β
∑
zt+1∈Γ(zt)
[
pi(zt+1|zt)
∂u
∂c˜TG,t+1
R2,t+1
]
− µq2,t + α2Et[R2,t+1] + α3q2,t
!
= 0
α1−(b˜1,tE[R1,t+1]−
˜¯b1) = 0,
α2−(b˜2,tEt[R2,t+1]−
˜¯b2) = 0,
α3−(b˜1,tq1,t + b˜2,tq2,t − w¯) = 0,
αnn−(c˜TG,t − (1− η)ht) = 0,
α can be interpreted as the shadow price of the borrowing constraint. If the constraint
does not bind then α is negative and α− positive which equalizes the ≥ constraint. So
essentially the borrowing constraint does not have a shadow price. If α is positive α+
is positive showing up in the FOCs while the borrowing constraint exactly binds. The
higher α the more costly is the constraint.
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